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LEO ARTICLE

The Legacy of LEO:
Lessons Learned from an English Tea and Cake Company’s
Pioneering Efforts in Information Systems∗
Richard O. Mason•
Carr P. Collins Professor of Management Information Sciences
Southern Methodist University
rmason@mail.cox.smu.edu
“The Leo team can certainly teach us a thing or two.”
Computing magazine1

Modern Lessons from LEO
Introduction
At the 1999 International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) held in Charlotte,
North Carolina, the Association for Information Systems made its first LEO awards for
outstanding contributions to the Information Systems community.2 Appendix A notes
the recipients as of December 2003.
LEO is the acronym for the Lyons Electronic Office, a business-oriented computer
system created by J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. Founded in 1887, the company’s teashops had
become a British institution. It was a family owned and run organization in the catering,
tea-and-cake shop, bakery, ice-cream and restaurant businesses. As such it was an
unlikely enterprise to undertake such a far-reaching innovation. The company was
better known for its Red and Green Label tea, foil-wrapped Kup Kakes, Lyons Maid ice
cream and, of course, its exceedingly popular “nippies,” those speedy, efficient
waitresses adorned in black blouses and starched white aprons who provided stellar
service in its over 250 teashops. Lyons’ restaurants set standards of “service to
customers” and “sumptuousness of surroundings that astonished and delighted
∗

Kalle Lyytinen was the accepting senior editor of this paper.
Dedicated to LEO Award recipient Frank Land who lived the LEO saga and provided
innumerable useful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. The editor and anonymous
reviewers also provided valuable guidance and corrections. Any errors that remain are mine.

•

1
2

Quoted from the back cover of the dust jacket of Caminer et.al., 1998.
For more information on the LEO award see aisnet.org/award/leorecip.shtml
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clientele” (Ferry, 2003, p. 10). Nevertheless, being in a low margin business, the
company’s leaders recognized an ever pressing business need to improve the efficiency
of its operations. Consequently, in the late 1940s the company decided to make a
computer, subsequently dubbed LEO. It became the world’s first office computer.
The legacy of LEO for the IS community is at once profound and bittersweet. In the first
place, the LEO project was a pacesetter, building the first computer and implementing
the first systems specifically designed for business operations. On Thursday, November
29, 1951, at its Cadby Hall facility in West London, Lyons ran the world’s first routine
office job on a stored-program electronic computer (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 1)3.
Unfortunately, the company’s pioneering effort had a limited reach. The considerable
accomplishments of the LEO team did not extend very far beyond the UK and,
consequently, many of their innovations had to be re-invented by others. In the end
there was a more tragic loss as well. Lyons’ systems design philosophy of “get-thewhole-system-right-the-first-time” and attention to detail, one that in large measure
remains the espoused yet seldom practiced ideal today, was not widely adopted. In the
end, it actually served to contribute to the company’s demise. In competition, IBM and
other hardware movers’ sales strategy of providing “good enough systems” beat out the
emphasis on perfection toward which the LEO team strove. Oxford science writer
Georgina Ferry summarizes:
“The LEO experiment, quixotic as it may have been in the context of a large catering
company, is worth remembering for much more than being first. It is worth
remembering because its architects never forgot what the computer was for: it was a
tool for business, and so it was their responsibility to make sure it worked for
business” (Ferry, 2003, p. 199).
During the last 50 plus years, many rather dramatic changes in management practices
have occured. As it turns out, a goodly number of these were pioneered or anticipated
or at least refined by a gutsy group of Lyons personnel whose overriding goal was to
discover improved methods for conducting their tea-and-cake and catering businesses.
We cannot claim that the management approaches initiated in that off-the-beaten-path
facility near London found their way directly to North America. There is no direct
evidence that their accomplishments influenced developments in the U.S., although
transoceanic communications were well established between Lyons and American firms.
Nor can we conclusively argue that British industry as a whole was materially affected by
Lyons’ innovations. Yet, many UK companies and government offices were directly
affected, and several early participants in LEO projects went on to have distinguished
and influential careers in business and academia.4
What can be claimed, however, is that many once loosely formed ideas about
information and management coalesced and were operationalized by Lyons personnel
3

Remington Rand’s claim to have the first business computer is discussed in Section II c below.
However, there was likely some modest cross-fertilization with North America. Two senior LEO
personnel, John Gosden and Paul Dixon, emigrated to Canada and the USA. Both worked in
consultancy and industry, Gosden was at Auerbach, the Mitre Corporation and Equitable Life.
Dixon was at the Mitre Corporation and Massey Ferguson, where he became head of global IS.
Both were active with ACM and IFIP and acknowledged for their contribution to the development
of business computing, which they themselves attributed to their LEO training. John Gosden died
December 2003. The ACM published an obituary in their newsletter with some very
complimentary words from Peter Denning. (Source: Personal Communication with Frank Land)

4
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during the postwar 1940s and the 1950s. Lyons was an innovator. Table 1 is a timeline
that demonstrates that the LEO project produced several computer-based business
applications prior to the key North American manufactures and users, specifically
UNIVAC, IBM, and Bank of America, the U.S. innovator in bank automation whose
decision processes were similar to those used at Lyons.

Table1. Time Line for the Legacy of Leo

Date

LEO and Lyons

1887
1890

J. Lyons & Co. founded

Other Significant Events
IBM – Herman Hollerith’s 80 column punch card
tabulator used for U.S. census
IBM - Hollerith incorporates as Tabulating Machine
Company
(TMC)
IBM – Hollerith’s TMC sold to the company that would
become IBM. Thomas J. Watson appointed general
manager

1896
(Dec.)
1911
(July)
1923
1930

John Simmons joins Lyons

1931

Simmons
establishes
Research Office

IBM – IBM and Powers Accounting Machine
Corporate (later part of Remington Rand) compete for
processing the 1930 U.S. Census.
Systems

1932

IBM – the IBM 405 alphabetic tabulating machine
released. Becomes the dominate design for punch
card processing
UNIVAC – US Ballistics Research Lab contracts with
the Moore School and Eckert and Mauchly to build
ENIAC.

1943
(April)

Loring Crosman approaches James Rand, Chairman
and President of Remington Rand, to build an
electronic computer for processing the company’s 90column punch cards
IBM – Howard Aiken’s Mark I inaugurated at Harvard

1944
(Aug.)
1945
(June)
(Dec.)
1946
(March)
(Aug.)

UNIVAC – Von Neumann’s EDVAC concept paper
introduces stored program idea
UNIVAC – ENIAC operational
UNIVAC – Eckert and Mauchly establish Electronic
Control Company (EEC) to commercialize computers
IBM – IBM 602 Calculating Punch incorporating
plugboard programming released
Maurice Wilkes attends Moore School
conference
on
ENIAC/EDVAC.
Conceives of EDSAC during his return

(Oct.)
1947
(May)
(Nov.)

1948

Two Lyons executives visit leading
computer organizations in the US to
learn about the state-of-the-art of
business computing
Simmons recommends that Lyons
build a machine but first support
Wilkes’ EDSAC effort. Board approves
grant to EDSAC and seconds a
technician to Cambridge
Max
Newman’s
Manchester

UNIVAC – US Census Bureau signs contract with
ECC for UNIVAC
UNIVAC – Prudential Insurance Co. says it intends to
order a UNIVAC for policy processing. The Pru’s
order is subsequently canceled

IBM – IBM 602-A an upgraded version of the IBM 602
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(June)
1949
(May)
(late)

University, “the Baby,” computer
executes first stored program
EDSAC completes first job on May 6
Work on LEO begins

1950
(Jan.)
(March)
(Dec.)
1951
(March)
(July)
(Nov.)

plugboard calculator released
IBM – Thomas J. Watson Sr. purportedly decides that
the market for computers is less than a dozen
UNIVAC – a prototype Remington Rand 409
plugboard programmed punch card calculator
demonstrated
Bank of America – SRI meets with BofA senior
executive Clark Beise
UNIVAC – Remington Rand acquires Eckert and
Mauchly’s Electronic Control Company
Bank of America – Beise asks Al Zipf to join
innovation team
UNIVAC – EDVAC finally operational at Aberdeen
Proving Grounds performing ballistics calculations.
UNIVAC I operational, delivered to US Census
Bureau
UNIVAC – 409 is commercially available

Leo runs bakery evaluation job.

First commercial computer job
1952
(Jan.)

Bank of America – BofA contracts with SRI to build
ERM (ERMA)
UNIVAC – second, third, and fourth Model 409’s
delivered to IRS

(April)

Ballistic calculation for Ordance Board
performed on LEO I
The first recorded service bureau job
seen on any UK computer. Spawns
outsourcing industry.

(Dec.)
1953
(March)
(April)

UNIVAC – Three UNIVAC I’s installed
UNIVAC – upgraded design of Model 409 renamed
UNIVAC 60 and UNIVAC 120
IBM – IBM 701, (Defense Calculator), a scientific
computer is dedicated

(July)
(Oct.)

Payroll pilot run on LEO I

1954
(Feb.)
(Oct.)

Lyons payroll fully operational, L1

Bank of America – Zipf sets up Systems and
Equipment Research unit. (similar to Lyons’ Systems
Research Office.)
Orders IBM 702
Teashops Distribution, L2, and Tea
Blending, L4, jobs operational

(Dec.)

UNIVAC – First UNIVAC for business applications
sold to General Electric Appliance Division to do
payroll
IBM – First IBM 650 delivered to John Hancock
Mutual Life
IBM – First IBM 702 installed.

1955
(Feb.)
(Sept.)
1956
(Jan.)
1957
(May)
1961

186

Bakery
Sales
operational
LEO II operational

Invoicing,

L3,

Bank of America – “ERMA Day” First bank check
processing computer operational
BofA’s first IBM 702 installed
Bank of America – Zipf appoints bank’s first
automation advisory council
UNIVAC – Forty-six UNIVAC I’s installed in total

LEO III operational
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(May)
1962

UNIVAC – Installations begin for Sperry Rand
UNIVAC 1100 designed with tightly coupled
multiprocessors and 1 to 6 identical instruction
processors
UNIVAC – UNIVAC 1004 extension of UNIVAC
60/120 RELEASED. This was the last plugboard
calculator produced by UNIVAC

(June)
1963
(Feb.)
1964
(April)
1968
(July)
(Nov.)
1981

Lyons’ computer business – LEO
Computers Ltd. – merged with English
Electric Company
LEO 326 operational

IBM – IBM 360 range announced

English Electric LEO Marconi merges
with ICT to form ECL. The old LEO
company is effectively dead
Post Office orders five LEO 326s.
Largest order for any vendor in UK to
date.
Post Office 326s taken out of service,
ending LEO’s life.

The management approaches perfected by the LEO project can be related directly to
what has evolved into a contemporary philosophy of information systems. The
information systems community can deepen its understanding of modern information
systems by examining Lyons’ experience with LEO in light of contemporary IS thinking
and practice – our current “received wisdom” - while at the same time paying homage to
our heritage.
In order to place the LEO team’s contributions into perspective, it is useful to propose a
mission statement for the field of information systems. This mission statement will serve
as a backdrop for understanding the field, its evolving set of increasingly powerful ideas,
and the role the LEO team played in forming and applying those ideas.

A Proposed IS Mission Statement
The mission of the IS discipline is to secure improvement in organizational performance
by managing the flow of data, information and knowledge provided, inter alia, by
information and communications technology (ICT).
The mid-20th century innovators of LEO would likely be congenial with this mission
statement. As their story shows, they took many actions that were consistent with this
sense of direction, although to my knowledge the Lyons executives never explicitly made
statements to this effect. These were executives who were “learning by doing.”
According to LEO award winner Frank Land, an early Lyons participant, the company’s
pre-computer approach was first to realize major improvements in performance by
establishing an organizational architecture5 that encouraged the best possible flow of
crucial information to relevant managers. That is, they got the information flows right
first. Then, Lyons’ systems personnel sought to apply the most appropriate technology
5

Drawing on the management theorist John Kay, Frank Land explains this use of the word
“architecture”: “By architecture Kay means the set of formal and informal relations that exist in the
enterprise. Kay describes architecture as ‘ . . .a network of relational contracts within, or around,
the firm’” (Land, 2000, p. 24; Kay, 1993.)
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to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these flows (Land, 1998). This approach
served them well when the company designed the LEO computer to meet its needs. For
the most part, these executives used common sense to plan for, build, and put into
operation a business-oriented computer that would solve their business’ problems. Their
story, however, is also a model of systems thinking, although at the time there were few
formal theories of business systems available to guide them in their task.
Drawing on this mission statement as a backdrop, the paper proceeds as follows.
Section IIa explains how and why was LEO conceived and built in terms of a theory of
the necessary roles for technological innovation: top level executive champion, maestro,
supertechs and systems translators. Section IIb,recounts maestro John Simmon’s
masterful orchestrating of the project.. Section III describes several new business
applications that were implemented on LEO. The paper ends with an Epilogue in Section
IV.

How and why LEO was conceived and built6
Finding a Maestro and Creating a Systems Organization: Laying the
Groundwork for Success
Historical research concludes that three conditions must be met for a technological
innovation to be organizationally successful.
First, the organization’s top-level
executives must include a champion for the technological project who has sufficient
vision, power, and prestige to initiate it and drive it to fruition. Second, a “maestro of
technology” must lead the effort. Maestros combine superior business acumen with
great insight into the technology and how it can be applied. They recruit and assemble a
strong team of technologists – the third necessary condition – and guide their activities
to completion (McKinney, Copeland and Mason, 1995, pp. 4-6, passim). Frank Land
insightfully suggests a fourth condition: that of a “systems translator” who interprets the
maestro’s vision in terms that facilitate systems design, programming and hardware
specifications and provides guidance for the supertechs.7 For the sake of brevity these
three roles are referred to respectively as executive, maestro, and supertechs, and the
fourth as systems translators.
John Richardson Mainwaring Simmons played the crucial role of maestro for the LEO
project. Simmons joined J. Lyons & Co. as a management trainee and statistician in
1923 fresh from Cambridge University. He graduated as a “wrangler,” a student with the
highest-class honors in mathematics. When he arrived at Lyons, Great Britain was just
recovering from severe economic and social losses the country suffered as a result of
World War I. Now, however, Lyons’ business was expanding again as people returned
to desiring teas and cakes and lunches served in convenient locations. Like most retail
6

Recent publications provide considerable detail about Lyons and LEO. See Aris, 2000; Bird,
1994, 2000, Caminer, 2003; Caminer, Aris, Hermon and Land, 1998; Ferry, 2003; Land, 1985,
1998; and 2000. See also Simmons 1962. This recounting stresses management and systems
thinking innovations.
7
Personal communication: Land also deplores the use of the awkward term “supertech” but this
term, which was coined by James O’Neill in the early 1970’s at American Airlines and used
broadly there, is the most descriptive we have come up with (see McKenney, Copeland and
Mason, 1995). Richard Mason is a LEO Award Recipient. See also Mason 1969, 2000, and
2003.
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operations, the demands of Lyons’ business were quite exacting. The business was
characterized by the handling of high volumes of low-ticket items, razor thin margins,
and considerable geographic scope within which to produce, store, and transport or
dispatch goods and services.8 Simmons realized that if the company was to be
economically successful, Lyons’ needed a way to process a higher volume of
transactions at higher speed and with greater precision. He was also keenly aware of
the company’s need for better management control data.9 Management’s previous
answer to this challenge had been simply to add more back office clerks and have them
track and record the ever-growing movement of goods and money. LEO pioneer David
Caminer describes the scene at the time:
“Back in the 1920s, when Simmons arrived, the ambience was still Dickensian, with
clerks standing at tall tables, and occasionally resting themselves on high stools.
Vestiges of this still remained 25 years later in the demeanor and dress on some of
the older clerks who still remained. There were residual Bob Cratchits, happy in the
few specialized tasks that had not been susceptible to mechanization.” (Caminer et.
al, 1998, p. 14-15)
MIT’s JoAnne Yates provides a similar glimpse into the pre-computer business
information world – 1880 to 1920 – in “Business Use of Information and Technology
during the Industrial Age.” (Chandler and Cortada, 2000, pp. 107-135) and in her more
comprehensive work Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American
Management (Yates, 1989).
Simmons was recruited by and reported to the highly respected company secretary,
George William Booth, the only nonfamily member on the Board of Directors. J. Lyons &
Co. was owned and controlled by the Salmon and Gluckstein families, who had
conducted a highly successful tobacco retailing firm. In large part to avoid confusion
among the public about its other businesses, the family picked a entrepreneur and
distant relative Joseph Nathaniel Lyons to form the new catering business and provide
his name for it. Booth, who joined the company in 1891, was the confidant and most
trusted advisor for the family during this period.10 Booth would play the crucial role of the
“executive” as the LEO saga unfolded. He recognized something special in Simmons
and soon gave him his unwavering support. Simmons’ ability to communicate clearly
with “the family” and with Booth and to earn their trust and confidence would
subsequently prove to be vital to LEO’s success.

8

Ferry observes “A typical teashop customer bought no more than a bun and a cup of tea,
costing a few pence. The profit to the company on that transaction might be as little as a farthing
(barely a tenth of a penny in today’s decimal currency, and even allowing for inflation worth only
about 4p).” (Ferry, 2003, p. 15)
9
Simmon’s requirement that managers must identify the factors that are critical to the business
operation’s success and marshal information with respect to them is consistent with a line of
thinking that eventually resulted in Rockart’s Critical Success Factor methodology (Rockart,
1979). John F. (Jack) Rockart is a LEO Award recipient. This line of thinking eventually led to
the development of decision support systems (DSS), executive support systems (ESS), and
group decision support systems (GDSS). LEO award recipients Paul Gray, Jay Nunamaker, and
Jack Rockart have been leaders in this endeavor.
10
“‘He [Booth] wasn’t family,’ says Anthony Salmon, former Lyons board member and grandson
of Montague Gluckstein, ‘but the family would never move without consulting him. He acted as a
public conscience’” (Ferry, 2003, p. 15).
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The first assignment Booth gave Simmons in the 1920s was to rationalize back office
operations and bring them under control. The situation had reached a point that James
Beniger would later call a “crisis of control” – events were occurring more rapidly and in
greater volume than the organization’s capacity to direct them toward its goals (Beniger,
1986, p. 9-16). One of Simmons’ first steps was to take a study trip to North America to
visit various leading organizations including IBM, Powers, and the American Machine
and Foundry Company. Drawing on what he had learned by studying Lyons’ operations,
and integrating this knowledge with lessons gleaned from his trip, Simmons crafted a
four pronged managerial approach for coping with the crisis very similar to what today is
called “systems analysis.”
1. Analyze each office job into its functional parts and then identify appropriate
methods and machinery for handling each sub-task.11
2. Establish cost standards and expectations for each product and task. Collect
data on actual performance and feed it back for comparison purposes.12
3. Create a systems research department to design systems, evaluate
technology, and establish information needs.
4. Implement a management structure and organizational architecture capable
of passing information rapidly from its sources in the field to decision makers
and to enable decision makers to ask “what if” questions.
As a result of Simmons’ efforts, by the late 1930s “in the British office management
world,” Caminer observes, “Lyons came to be recognized as a center of excellence in
everything that concerned office systems and management” (Caminer, et. al. 1998, p.
15). In retrospect, Simmons’ four-pronged program is similar to many “best practices”
approaches that had evolved around the same time and later in the United States.
Systems were defined and analyzed into their component parts.
Information
requirements were specified and methods devised to collect and distribute the requisite
information. Negative feedback loops were constructed by establishing standards (or
forecasts or expectations) and collecting data on actual performance to be compared
with these standards. Deviations were calculated and fed back to managers so that
corrective action could be taken.13
11

This application of systems thinking was introduced in the U.S. in the late 19th century by
Frederick Winslow Taylor who called it “scientific management.” Chicagoian William Henry
Leffingwell applied the notions to office work early in the 20th century (Leffingwell, 1917). Forms
printers such as the Moore Business Forms, Inc. and Standard Register Company
commericalized some of these authors’ ideas for achieving efficiency in the office.
12
Management control in organizations involves three primary phases: planning, coordination
and control. The development of standard costs for central work activities using, among other
methods, time and motion studies takes place during the planning phase and collecting actual
costs for comparison comprises control. An important element of the control phase is
performance feedback and evaluation of the cost variances. Costing methods date back at least
to 1830 with Charles Babbage’s study and were developed further around 1890, in Great Britain
by the economist Alfred Marshall and in the in U.S. by Taylor about 1903. Simmons was drawing
on this tradition. See Billy Goetz 1949 and The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 6, 1970 pp.
588-599.
13
Ferry describes “Each [factory] was laid out to handle the particular kind of cake, pie, bun, loaf
or bread roll in which it specialized. Under the direction of a Planning Office, every operation was
time-and-motion studied to arrive at a fair, efficient time. These times were used both to calculate
the number of staff required, and to compute the standard cost of the labor entailed in making the
product, which in turn partly determined its selling price.” (Ferry, 2003, p.21)

190

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 5 No. 5, pp. 183-219/May2004

Mason/Legacy of LEO

Alfred P. Sloan and F. Donaldson Brown had brought this kind of systems thinking to
General Motors beginning in 1920. Brown had pioneered this approach previously while
Treasurer at du Pont. As a result, by 1926 Albert Bradley, an economist with experience
as a treasurer and comptroller, could report enthusiastically on GM’s techniques at a
meeting of the American Management Association:
“The first and controlling principle in the establishment of General Motor’s production
schedules is that they shall be based absolutely upon the ability of its distributors and
dealers to sell cars to the public. Each car division now receives from its dealers
every ten days the actual number of cars delivered to consumers, the number of new
orders taken, the total orders on hand, and the number of new and used cars on
hand. Each ten-day period the actual results are compared with the month’s
forecast, and each month, as these figures are received, the entire situation is
carefully analyzed to see whether the original estimate was too high or too low. If it
is decided that the estimate is too high, the production schedule is immediately
reduced. If, on the other hand, it is found that the retail demand is greater than had
been estimated, the production program is increased, provided the plant capacity
permits. . . . . the Corporation now follows the policy of keeping production at all
times under control and in correct alignment with the indicated annual retail demand,
with the minimum accumulation of finished products in the hands of dealers for
seasonal requirements, which the flexibility of the production schedule permits.
(Bradley, 1926, P. 181.)
This is classic management control as Robert Anthony (1965) later described it.
Simmons did not visit GM or du Pont, but it is likely that in his quest for improved
management methods he learned about the massive changes Sloan, Brown, and
Bradley were bringing about at the emerging automobile firm. At any rate, his approach
was similar. As computers later came upon the scene, this approach to management
control would assume fundamental importance. For example, in their quite early
computer information systems textbook, Gregory and Van Horn (1960) explain that
exceptional reporting feedback control systems, such as developed at GM and Lyons,
were essential for selecting the information to be reported to managers as part of a
“management information system.” The authors identify two methods for selecting the
information to be communicated to management: (1) to scan reports to find significant
differences and (2) to “report only those items that vary significantly from the planned
results” (Gregory and Van Horn, 1960, p. 340). By adopting his four pronged
information management approach at Lyons, Simmons was anticipating one of the
cornerstone concepts of computer-based management information systems.
Simmons was a quintessential “maestro of technology.” Arthur Squires coined the term
to describe the leaders of many successful large technology projects such as the
Manhattan Project (Squires, 1986). As stated earlier, research on North American
innovators of “dominant design” information systems, such as the Bank of America’s
ERMA (circa 1960) and American Airlines’ SABRE (circa 1964), reveals that each
organization had at least one exceptional senior executive who played the crucial role of
“maestro.” This executive is positioned between the top executives and the board on
one side, and a strong technical team on the other. He (in the early days they were
almost always “his men”) communicates well with each side, translating differing
languages and view points between the two parties. Importantly, a maestro understands
deeply how the technology can be aligned with the business’ needs and goals. He plans
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and implements new technological infrastructures; recruits, organizes, and leads a team
of talented technologists; and insures that organizational processes are changed to take
full advantage of the technology’s potential (McKenney, Copeland and Mason, 1995, p
1-11). Al Zipf at the Bank of America, who spearheaded the ERMA system and
business applications of IBM’s 702, is the prototype North American computer era
maestro. Charles Ammann, Fred Plugge, and Max Hopper, successive leading
technology officers at American Airlines, also were exceptional maestros.
In the late 1940s, as LEO was being conceived, Lyons had in place, or soon would
acquire, the three major ingredients for success: (1) visionary leadership on the part of
G. W. Booth and members of the founding Gluckstein and Salmon families who
comprised the company’s board, especially Director Anthony Salmon,14 (2) a maestro in
the person of Simmons to orchestrate the technical team toward a successful completion
of their innovative project, and (3) a talented group of managerial systems and technical
people or “supertechs.” Major contributors to the technical initiatives were Thomas
Raymond Thompson,15 (also a “wrangler” and a close associate of Simmons), Oliver
Standingford, David Caminer, John Aris, Peter Hermon, John Gosden, Derek Hemy,
Ernest Lenaerts, Leo Fantl, Ralph Land, Frank Land, and Dr. David Wheeler, whose
Ph.D. dissertation at Cambridge under Maurice Wilkes was the first ever written on
programming an electronic computer. The LEO computer itself was built under the
direction of Dr. John Pinkerton, a Cambridge physicist who Wilkes described as the
“most able of all the industrial computing engineers at that time.” (Ferry, 2003, p. 89) As
it turns out, this collection of extraordinary people fulfilled all of the roles necessary to
complete a successful technological innovation (See Table 2).
Well before the development of LEO, however, Simmons was responsible for at least
two other managerial innovations that were crucial to the company’s computer initiative’s
success. One was to rationalize Lyons’ existing basic business processes to get them
under control prior to automation. The popular – and all too appropriate – phrase
“garbage in, garbage out” was coined to describe the many instances in which
organizations failed to get their house in order before attempting to computerize it.
David Caminer recalls:
“My own role as Programming Manager [for LEO] sprang directly from my previous
post as Manager manager of the Systems Research Office. The aim from the time
Simmons had established the function, as far back as 1931, had been to build totally
integrated systems from the ground up. . . . it was a cardinal principle that they [office
technologies and later computer applications] should not be introduced without the
system as a whole being reexamined. There was no question of leaving the system
as it stood and merely mechanizing those aspects that most readily presented
themselves. The computer was to be considered in the same way” (Caminer, 2003,
p. 25). Thus, no process was simply automated. Rather, in Shoshana Zuboff’s
instructive term, it was “informated” (Zuboff, 1988) or, to draw on a more popular
14

Bird observes “The project was not without influential supporters, and one of the family
champions was Anthony Salmon, Director. He had been given responsibility for the LEO project
in 1953 and his active interest in all matters associated with it helped secure management
commitments and the necessary flow of funds” (Bird, 1994, pp. 84-85).
15
Peter Bird says of Thompson, who started at Lyons on June 1, 1931, and Simmons “During the
next thirty-five years these two brilliant mathematicians together transformed Lyons’ office
procedures; in doing so they placed Lyons at the forefront of expertise in clerical methods” (Bird,
2000, p. 306).
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recent notion, the business process was “reengineered” (Hammer and Champy,
1993). Thus, the first two prongs of Simmons’ four-pronged approach were applied
to avoid the pitfall of providing bad information more quickly.
Table 2. Key Innovation Roles for LEO*
I. Visionary Leadership:
Board Members:

G. W. Booth, Company Secretary
Anthony Salmon, Managing Director of LEO computers
Members of Gluckstein and Salmon families

II. Maestro:
Maestro:

John R. M. Simmons

III. Management Systems and Technical People (Supertechs)
Steering the Project:
Project Executive
T. R. Thompson (member of the Board of LEO computers)
Systems Translators:
Engineering:
John Pinkerton
Systems and Programming:
David Caminer
Operating:
Anthony Barnes
Project Leaders
Engineers:
Systems and Programming:

Ernest Lenaerts, Ernest Kaye
Derek Hemy, Leo Fantl, John Grover, Mary Blood, Frank
Land, John Gosden
Operating:
Peter Wood
Cambridge University Collaboration
David Wheeler, influential Cambridge research student

*Based on a classification suggested by Frank Land. See also Bird (1994) pp. 40-52.

Related to his insistence on optimizing information flows before automating them was
Simmons’ emphasis on getting economies from “write-it-once” designs. Lyons historian
Peter Bird recalls: “Simmons had realized that the most efficient method of processing
business data was to have it recorded at the outset in a form that could be understood
by a machine. These ideas were radical and far-reaching, but it was not until the
Second World War, which created acute staff shortages, that he was able to take them
further” (Bird, 2000, p.307).
The second key innovation at Lyons was to set up a special organization and methods
unit within the company called the Systems Research Office (after World War II renamed
Organization and Methods or “O&M”). Systems Research was dedicated to analyzing
the business’ systems and fitting suitable technologies to them.16 Importantly, this
organization also served as the political base for instituting change.
Applying
appropriate, business specific technology to its problems sometimes meant, as it did in
the case of LEO, that Lyons took the lead in creating new technology rather than
accepting “off-the-shelf” technology from existing manufactures. In the early days of
computer applications in the U.S., the Bank of America and American Airlines accepted
the same responsibility. Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, applying
16

Establishing a unit with this mission was consistent with a trend begun by U.S. railroads during
the mid-19th century to establish control over operations and continued by insurance and other
data intensive companies. (See Beniger, 1986; Chandler, 1962, 2000; Yates, 1989) Lyons was
a leader in this respect in the U.K. and likely on a par with leading U.S. firms such as Prudential
Life Insurance, du Pont and GM.
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technology to a company’s specific business problems and opportunities is often too
important to be left solely to hardware and software manufacturers.
In the late 1920s, Simmons and his colleagues recognized that a deep chasm might
emerge between the company’s operating managers and its technologists and
information systems specialists unless some mediating organization was created.
Systems design always requires generating several alternative approaches and
selecting the best one for achieving the organization’s overall strategic goals. In his
classic 1967 article, “Management Misinformation Systems,” Russell Ackoff points out
how the different interests of different units of an organization’s division of labor often
come into conflict with one another, resulting in these units having different preferences
for information and technology (Ackoff, 1967). Thus, tradeoffs must be made between
the competing interests of the various parties who are – and must be – involved. At
Lyons, Systems Research undertook this crucial mediating task.
Over two decades after Simmons created Systems Research, Harvard Business School
Professor F. Warren McFarlan, in an unpublished memorandum dated January 14,
1963, a white paper intended as a background document for developing a new
curriculum at the school, described the function of and challenge facing such a
department:
“The information handling specialists [an early term for information systems
professionals] have a dynamic responsibility to utilize new techniques for the
improvement of information available for management control and operational control
processes. The proper interaction between operating people and information
handling specialists in implementing this responsibility is essential.
“Operating people bring to a problem their practical experience and a conception of
what their needs are. They also bring a bias, which favors preservation of the status
quo. [And, according to Russell Ackoff, a bias toward satisfying the interests of their
individual organizational units.] The information handling analyst brings with him his
broad experience in tackling a number of systems problems. Often he has a broader
conception of these problems than does the operating manager. He also has
analytical and technological tools that the operating manager is unfamiliar with. His
bias is towards the introduction of too much change. The information handling
analyst performs the function of an innovator and catalyst. He must educate the
operating manager concerning the available sources of information and urge him to
take appropriate action. While it is not his responsibility to decide what information
the manager should have, it is his responsibility to show the manager what
information he can have. For his part, the operating manager must actively
contribute his time and experience to the design of a system to assure that he will
get the information most useful to his needs. It is only through his sustained interest
that meaningful information, which he is predisposed to use, will be developed.
Successful implementation of an improvement in information handling requires
coordinated efforts by both information handling specialists and operating
personnel.” (Quoted in Anthony, 1965, page 96-97)
What McFarlan was proposing to the field at large in 1963 the Bank of America had
already been doing for about a decade and Lyons for much longer. The maestro
negotiates among the interests of senior management, business operating personal
representing various units, information specialists, and technologists and leads them to a
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common solution, one aimed at achieving the organization’s overall goals. The systems
department, therefore, is the organizational vehicle used to accomplish this. Al Zipf
assumed responsibility for the newly created Systems and Equipment Research
Department (S&ER) in October 1953 when he was appointed assistant vice president at
the Bank of America. S&ER would ultimately become to the bank what Systems
Research was to Lyons: an organization set up “to ensure that the most suitable
machines were installed and that they were incorporated into comprehensive systems
aimed at producing, in a secure and timely way, the information needed by management
at all levels to run the business” (Caminer, 2003 p 15). Virtually all organizations that
have succeeded in applying information and communication technology to their business
problems have created a department with a similar mission. Today, this department
generally reports to the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Technology Officer
(CTO), the contemporary institutional labels for the maestro’s role. Simmons, who
ultimately joined Lyons’ board, was a forerunner of the modern CIO.

Conceiving LEO
World War II severely interrupted Lyons’ business. Demand slackened, raw materials
were in short supply, what was available was needed for the war effort, key personnel
joined the military or defense operations, shops were closed. When the war was over
and people had returned to peacetime activities, consumer interest in tea-and-cake
shops peaked once more. As a result, by 1947 a new and more severe crisis of control
had emerged at Lyons. The company once again needed to rationalize its business
operations and find more economical ways to cope with the volume, pace and
complexity of the business environment it was facing.
McKinsey consultant Ronald Daniel described the difficulty U.S. companies were having
in maintaining control and profitability in the expanded post war economy.
“In each company the origin of the problem lay in the gap between a static
information system and a changing organizational structure. This difficulty is not new
or uncommon. There is hardly a major company in the United States whose plan of
organization has not been changed and rechanged since World War II. And with
revised structures have come new jobs, new responsibilities, new decision-making
authorities, and reshaped reporting relationships. All of these factors combine to
create new demands for information – information that is usually missing in existing
systems. As a result, many leading companies are suffering a major information
crisis – often without fully realizing it” (Daniel, 1961, p. 111).
By 1947, however, Simmons was “fully” aware of Lyons’ impending information crisis
and the company’s crisis of control. News of an “Electronic Brain” had reached England.
Captivated by the imagined possibilities of such a marvel, Assistant Controller Oliver
Standingford believed that what war-time computers had done for making complex
ballistics calculations, some version of an electronic brain could do for solving business
office problems. He took his idea to Simmons. After short deliberation it was proposed
that Standingford accompany Thomas Raymond Thompson, chief assistant comptroller
and Simmons’ key lieutenant, on a trip to the United States to visit key parties in the
newly emerging computer-business world. Their assignment was to learn what was
being done in business information processing, to see what new business processes
had been developed during World War II, and, incidentally to learn about developments
in computers. Arrangements were made through Dr. Herman H. Goldstine of the
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Electronic Computer Project at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University.
Thompson and Standingford’s report of their visit during May and June of 1947 is a vital
historical document. It serves as a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in computers in the
U.S. at the time. Moreover, it places in perspective the conditions under which Lyons
conceived of and created LEO. While in the U.S., the two visitors made 10 major
contacts.
1. Dr. Goldstine. As a captain in the Army, Goldstine had worked with John W.
Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert of the University of Pennsylvania’s Moore School
of Electrical Engineering to begin planning the ENIAC – Electronic Numerical
Integrator And Computer – in 1943. ENIAC is, arguably, the most important
machine of the era. It was completed in 1945. Goldstine had worked with
mathematician John von Neumann and was quite familiar with one of the key
documents of the information age: von Neumann’s 1945 First Draft of a Report
on the EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer). The EDVAC
idea (now better known as the von Neumann architecture) became the dominant
design blueprint for the modern computer (See, for example, Eames, and Eames
1973). Goldstine acknowledged that little was being done in the U.S. at the time
with respect to applying computers to business problems, but he was intrigued
with the possibilities. Thompson and Standingford visited him a second time just
before returning to England. During this second visit, Goldstine outlined for them
his thoughts about a general technical approach for a business oriented
computer. Importantly, Goldstine provided introductions to Cambridge University
Professors Douglas Hartree and Dr. Maurice Wilkes (recently honored as Sir
Maurice Wilkes). Goldstine had met Hartree during Hartree’s trip to the U.S.
2. The Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania.
Thompson and Standingford saw new developments on a post-ENIAC machine.
The visit was informative; but, in general, they were disappointed, noting that
morale was low since the original team had disbanded.
3. John Presper Eckert, Electronic Control Company in Philadelphia. While at the
University of Pennsylvania, electrical engineer John Presper Eckert and physicist
John William Mauchly developed ENIAC following Mauchly’s visit with University
of Iowa scientist John Vincent Atanasoff. Atanasoff arguably invented the basic
concepts of computer technology. Eckert and Mauchly left the Moore School in
March of 1946 to pursue commercial interests. Before the end of the war they
had visited the Bureau of the Census proposing the idea that an electronic
computer might help with census data processing and in October of 1946 they
signed a contract to build an EDVAC (von Neumann) type machine for the
Bureau. The following spring EDVAC was renamed UNIVAC – UNIVersal
Automatic Computer. In 1951 Remington Rand Corporation, which had acquired
the Electronic Control Company, delivered the first American commercial
computer, UNIVAC I, to the Census Bureau and announced that it was available
to the commercial market. During their meeting, Eckert described his plans for
building a general purpose commercial machine. Eckert also discussed the
company’s negotiations with the Prudential Insurance Company of America to do
routine premium billing and actuarial calculations.
4. Radio Corporation of America Laboratories. Research engineers at RCA were
working on memory technology utilizing a cathode ray tube that was capable of
storing about 4,000 impulses accessible by photo-electronic means. Thompson
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and Standingford included this technology as a candidate for their computer’s
storage device.
5. IBM. Thompson and Standingford witnessed a demonstration of a punch card
multiplier (likely the 602A or its predecessor). They concluded that “as far as we
were able to see the aim of this company is to use electronic calculation purely
as an adjunct to punched cards” (Caminer et. al., 1998, P. 351). This was a
reflection of Thomas Watson Sr.’s view that selling electronic computers would
cut into the company’s lucrative punch card business. IBM later, in 1951, built a
computer for the Defense Department that was subsequently renamed the IBM
701. Still primarily a scientific computer with limited input and output capability,
nineteen IBM 701’s were eventually sold, eight to aerospace companies, four to
other corporations, four to government agencies, and three to universities. The
company developed the IBM 702 with greater I/O capacity in 1952 to meet
business data processing needs. Al Zipf ordered an IBM 702 for the Bank of
America in October of 1953 to perform management reporting and other highvolume, repetitive clerical tasks. In late 1958, the bank added exception
reporting, trend analysis, and notice of time-dependent actions. The first
computer to reach a large-scale business market was the IBM 650 announced in
1953. At the time of Thompson and Standingford’s 1947 visit, however, IBM was
not aggressively pursuing electronic computing. (Although, as discussed below,
the company did participate in Howard Aiken’s Mark I project and, thus, had
some experience in automatic, general-purpose, digital calculation.)
6. National Cash Register Company. NCR had an electronic research section and,
due to the company’s extensive cash register and accounting machine business,
had considerable interest in trends affecting their business. Thompson and
Standingford were unable to learn much from their visit.
7. Burroughs Adding Machine Company. Thompson and Standingford’s experience
at Burroughs was much the same as at NCR. They were unable to learn much.
Burroughs also would enter the general purpose computer market a few years
later.
8. U.S. Army at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The Lyons executives had obtained
permission through the British Embassy to see a demonstration on the new
version of ENIAC; but, at the last moment the permit was withdrawn.
9. Prudential Life Insurance Company of America. The Prudential had a long
history of rationalizing its business processes in order to handle large volumes of
transactions and actuarial calculations. The company installed Hollerith punch
cards in 1891 and subsequently switched to a specially made mechanical cardperforating machine and sorter devised by John Gore, an actuary qua inventor
who believed the company needed to continue to innovate in office systems if it
intended to become more efficient and stay competitive. The Prudential
continued to appreciate the value of information processing after Gore left, and
by the time of Thompson and Standingford’s visit the company’s rather extensive
Methods Division was managed by a leading thinker with wartime experience in
computers: Dr. Edmund C. Berkeley. Dr. Berkeley believed at the time that
“Prudential was the only commercial concern [in the U.S.] actively interested in
the application of electronic machinery in its offices” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p.
352.). The visit report describes some of Berkeley’s plans:
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“Their project is to build a machine that will carry out the premium billing of their
millions of policy holders, a job that at present occupies a staff of some 300
clerks. They anticipate that this work can be done with less than 20 percent of
the staff in about two days per month. The remainder of the machine’s time will
be given up to actuarial calculations. They are proceeding with detailed plans,
and Dr. Berkeley is confident that they will have a machine installed within about
two years. When they have established premium billing, they propose to
continue their investigation with a view to putting other routine work on the
machine, including the writing of contracts for which they have some 200
standard clauses from which to select” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 351).
In May 1947 Prudential received a proposal from Eckert and Mauchly to
computerize premium billing, mortality tables, and group insurance by converting
“information into punched cards with IBM or Remington Rand punch machines”
for later conversion to magnetic tape (Yates, 1997, p. 68). Augarten reports that
when Eckert and Mauchly’s Electronic Control Company announced the release
of the UNIVAC in 1948 the company had five contracts: two from the U.S.
government, two from the market research firm A. C. Nielson, and one from the
Prudential (Augarten, 1984, p.161). Had this contract proceeded according to
Berkeley’s plans, Prudential would likely have run a commercial application
before Lyons ran one on LEO. But, in a dispute with Remington Rand, after its
acquisition of Eckert and Mauchly’s company, both Neilson and Prudential
cancelled their orders. Prudential bought its first computer from IBM several
years later. In 1949, Berkeley published the first popular book on computers
Giant Brains, or Machines That Think.
10. Howard H. Aiken’s Computational Laboratory at Harvard University. In 1937
Howard Aiken, a former Westinghouse engineer who was working as an
instructor in applied mathematics at Harvard, developed a proposal for an
electromechanical calculator. There “exist problems,” he wrote, “beyond our
ability to solve, not because of theoretical difficulties, but because of insufficient
means of mechanical computation” (Eames, 1973, p. 122). Thomas Watson Sr.
was impressed with his ideas and in 1938 assigned an engineer to work on the
project at Harvard. Originally called the “Automatic Sequence Controlled
Calculator” the machine was manufactured at IBM’s Endicott plant and delivered
to Harvard in February 1944. Renamed the Mark I, Aiken’s machine began
running ballistics problems for the Navy in April. In addition to ballistics, the Mark
I was used for scientific type calculations in ship design, physics, lens design,
insurance, economics (such as Wassily Leontief’s input-output models), and
linguistics. Mark I contained 760,000 electrical components, 500 miles of wire
and could read two 23-digit numbers from paper tape inputs, process them and
punch the result out in three seconds. The machine, however, was designed for
performing mathematical calculations, not logic. It did not have the logic capacity
to execute conditional jumps. Thompson and Standingford saw the Mark I
demonstrated and quickly recognized that it was not strictly an electronic
computer. Nevertheless, they were struck by its reliability. It was slower than
ENIAC, but Mark I had an up time of about 80 percent – versus closer to 20
percent for ENIAC. The increased down-time on ENIAC was due largely to need
to service or replace its some 18,000 undependable valves. Mark II, the Lyons
visitors observed, was 12 times faster than Mark I; but it was gigantic, filling a
large room. Mark III, 20 times faster than Mark II and utilizing a high-speed
magnetic drum for its memory, was still under construction at the time of their
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visit. Importantly, Thompson and Standingford were impressed with three things:
(1) Aiken’s management style (his “faith, enthusiasm, and drive are reflected in
everyone in the laboratory” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 352), (2) his pragmatic
approach (focusing first on reliability and accuracy), and (3) his vision that
eventually computers would automatically control factories, unleashing a second
industrial revolution. This made them aware of the taxing requirements of
managing a computer – i.e. the need for operating systems – and the emerging
importance of what today is called “software.” Aiken’s technology had little
influence on the Lyons personnel but his philosophy had a substantial impact on
their thinking.17
In the summer of 1947 Thompson and Standingford were able to witness and evaluate
the early stages of the development of the U.S. computer industry and to meet face-toface with several of its leading lights. Looking back from the perspective of the passage
of more than 50 years, it is remarkable how much of the state-of-the-art at the time they
were able to tap into. The two visitors learned a great deal about the technical
requirements of computers and the emerging notions of programming. Based on the
evidence they collected, they also determined that, with respect to business information
processing, none of these sources were working on technologies that would satisfy
Lyons’ needs.
Upon their return to England, Thompson and Standingford visited the Mathematical
Laboratory at Cambridge headed by Dr. Maurice Wilkes. They had been referred to
Professor Douglas Hartree, a mathematical physicist interested in computing, by both
Goldstine and Aiken. Hartree had visited the U.S. and seen the Moore School’s
progress on ENIAC as part of his wartime work for the Ministry of Supply. He had then
proposed to Cambridge that the university form a committee to consider building its own
computer. Wilkes was selected to head that effort. As mathematicians, neither Hartree
nor Wilkes had previously considered business applications for computers. But, they
were intrigued by the prospect, and they told the Lyons’ executives that “they are
interested in applying their machine to any clerical job we may suggest, and they are
ready to assist in translating clerical procedure into terms of coded instructions”
(Caminer et. al. 1998, p. 354). Thus, Lyons had found a much needed partner for
developing its own computer.
The computer concept that Wilkes was working on became known as EDSAC –
Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Calculator. He worked on its design while attending
the Moore School lectures during the summer of 1946 where he learned about von
Neumann’s First Draft of the EDVAC stored program concept. Visits to Aiken’s
laboratory to see Mark I and to MIT to see Jay Forrester’s Whirlwind, convinced him that
the use of massive arrays of relays and tubes was not a viable long term solution.
17

It is interesting to note that during World War II Grace Hopper was assigned to the Navy’s
project at Harvard. In 1943 she was a programmer for Mark I and developed the original
operating system. Later, working on UNIVAC she wrote the first practical compiler and was
instrumental in developing and promoting COBOL -- Common Business Oriented Language.
John Gosden joined Lyons as a trainee programmer in 1953 and met Hopper in 1958. They
remained in correspondence until she retired. In February 1959, Gosden sketched out a new
higher level language, CLEO, for a new, faster, microprogramming; multiprogramming generation
of LEO called LEO III. CLEO’s development coincided with the development of COBOL and was
a similar yet less comprehensive problem oriented programming language.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 5 No. 5, pp. 183-219/May2004

199

Mason/Legacy of LEO

Stored programming, he concluded, was the answer. Sailing back on the Queen Mary,
he sketched out the design of a “computer of modest dimensions very much along the
lines of the EDVAC proposal.” (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996, p. 102) Wilkes
wanted to produce a workable machine as quickly as possible. So, like Aiken, he
stressed reliability and simplicity in design. His goal was to “try out real programs
instead of dreaming them up for an imaginary machine” (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray,
1996, p. 103). As a result of his dedicated efforts to adhere to this engineering
philosophy, EDSAC was completed in just over two years. It performed its first
automatic computation on May 6, 1949. Goldstine claims that EDSAC was the first
machine in the world to execute a stored program (Goldstine, 1972, p. 197). That
distinction, however, more likely goes to Max Newman’s Manchester University
computer – “the Baby” – that was demonstrated in June 1948 (Ceruzzi, 1999, p. 23,
Ferry, 2003, p. 76). The control and computing units of Wilkes’ EDSAC used short
acoustic delay line tubes to store bits for short periods of time rather than the faster, but
more difficult to control and definitely less reliable, cathode ray tube (CRT) based
storage. CRT’s were pioneered by F. C. “Freddie” Williams at Manchester University
and later adopted by Jay Forrester for Whirlwind and by IBM for its early computers
(Bashe et. al, 1986). Implementation of the stored program von Neumann is fundamental
to the modern concept of a computer.
Wilkes had to overcome one significant barrier in getting EDSAC completed in time to
meet his schedule and turn his attention to the Lyons project: money. During their
meeting in 1947, Wilkes told Thompson and Standingford that detailed plans for the
machine were complete, and they left believing that he had a staff of only one draftsman
and two temporary vacation students working with him. Wilkes later told Frank Land
(personal communication with the author) that he also had several PhD students and
more than one member of the academic department working on EDSAC to develop a
program to calculate prime numbers. Any additional funds, however, would definitely
speed up his progress. Thompson and Standingford concluded that 2000 to 3000 British
pounds (about $6000) would be enough to bring Wilkes’ prime number demonstration
program to completion. David Wheeler programmed it. These funds allowed the
Cambridge group to turn more of their attention to Lyons’ needs. An era of cooperation
was begun.

Simmons Takes Action
Upon reviewing Thompson and Standingford’s report, Simmons weighed several
alternative strategies for the company to take to develop a computer to the company’s
business needs: (1) try to persuade Wilkes and Hartree to help Lyons take the basic
EDSAC design and modify it to become a business-oriented machine, (2) work with
Eckert and Mauchley in the U.S., (3) cooperate with other British electrical companies,
(4) form a research alliance with the British government, or (5) “build a machine in our
own workshops, drawing information and advice from Cambridge and Harvard
Universities” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 21). After due deliberation Simmons decided on
the fifth option. He then submitted Thompson and Standingford’s report to the board of
directors with a cover letter concluding:
“We feel, therefore, that the company might well wish to take a lead in the
development of the machine . . .” (Caminer et. al., 1998, page 21).
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For the Lyons’ machine to succeed, Cambridge first had to succeed. Simmons
requested immediate support for Wilkes in order to expedite the university’s efforts. In
November 1947 the Lyons board agreed to provide aid to Cambridge University to
encourage the completion of EDSAC.
“This was seen as providing a basis for a Lyons system once EDSAC had proven
itself. Three weeks later a delegation, led by Booth, the veteran Company Secretary,
then in sight of his 80th birthday, visited Cambridge and made an offer of $8400 and
the services of an electrical assistant in return for guidance in constructing a
computer for Lyon’s own purposes” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 22).
As part of the deal, Lyons was allowed to second one of its own technicians, Ernest
(Len) Lenaerts, to work on the EDSAC before returning to Lyons and joining the LEO
team (Caminer, 2003). Lenaerts’ experience at Cambridge proved to be invaluable.
Thereafter, Wilkes’ Mathematical Laboratory at Cambridge and J. Lyons & Co. formed
what today would be called a cooperative alliance to help each other produce computers
and programs. As a result, in late 1947 Lyons played an instrumental part in speeding
up the completion of EDSAC, which was demonstrated in May 1949. After, EDSAC
proved itself, Lyons decided to proceed with building LEO. For their part, the Cambridge
team provided valuable technical advice on components and programming approaches
to help Lyons produce LEO. A prototype of LEO, the world’s first business computer,
was demonstrated to Her Royal Highness Princess Elizabeth in February 1951.
Subsequently, on Thursday, November 29, 1951, the first production model of LEO ran
what is by most accounts the world’s first regular routine office computer job.
LEO’s claim as the first computer designed specifically for business application has been
contested. But the validity of this claim depends on the definition of a “computer.” In
1949, a prototype of the Remington Rand 409 plugboard programmed punch card
calculator was demonstrated. The machine was made commercially available in July,
1951. After Remington Rand’s acquisition of Eckert and Mauchly’s Electronic Control
Company, it was renamed the Univac 60 or Univac 120 depending on the unit’s memory
size. The Univac 60/120 was indeed used for business applications such as tax and
payroll calculations.18 This gives some credence to William B. Wenning, an early
participant’s claim that the “Barn,” Remington Rand’s laboratory located at a Carriage
House for Rockledge Estate on Highland Avenue in Rowayton, Connecticut, was the
“Birth place of the First Business Computer.” Theirs was a remarkable and often
overlooked achievement. Nevertheless, since the 409 and the Univac 60/120 were not
stored program computers (nor was the successor, the Univac 1004, released in June
1962). They qualify as plugboard programmed “calculators” – more like IBM 602A –
than as “computers.”19 LEO I was a full-fledged stored program computer.
18

The author had the privilege of designing systems and helping program a Univac 120 at Fort
Lewis, Washington, while on active duty in 1957 to implement the Army’s Command
Management System. I learned a great deal about designing business systems from that
experience which proved useful when I returned to the Burroughs Corporation and worked with
the Burroughs (Electro Data) B205, B220 and B5000 series machines.
19
See W. B. Wenning “Remington Rand’s First Computer,”
www.rowayton.org/rhs/Computers/hstrandsfirst.htm; and Fay, Frances X.
www.rowayton.org/rhs/Computers/hstbirthhour.htm
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The technical characteristics of LEO I are summarized in Appendix A.

What new business applications did LEO develop?
Thinking About Business Applications
Thompson and Standingford outlined three possible applications for a business-oriented
computer in their 1947 report: sales invoicing and inventory, letter writing (similar to
today’s word processing), and payroll. For each application they identified both the
static and dynamic information required.
They then proceeded to specify the
components necessary for the machine to carry out the applications: multiple input
sources (in their case magnetic wire), printed and electronic outputs, instruction storage,
and processing capabilities. It is clear from their report that a machine designed for
business had discernibly different requirements from a machine intended to perform
purely scientific tasks, such as ballistics calculations.
This idea of envisioning a machine from a business applications perspective was quite
visionary for the time and anticipated future developments. In his 1956 book, for
example, Canning discusses two leading edge applications of systems analysis and
computer application: inventory control in a department store and production control in
job shop manufacturing. Gregory and Van Horn’s 1960 text illustrates the newly
emerging field of electronic business-data processing with a sales analysis problem, an
application that involves accumulating, analyzing, summarizing, and reporting sales and
inventory data to managers in marketing. They model their example on The General
Electric Company Sales Analysis Applications report published in 1957. GE was an
early installer of UNIVAC I and subsequently used it for production control, logistics
planning, and payroll. Basic approachs to applications like these, however, were
identified in the 1947 report and developed at Lyons early in the game.

The Cadby Hall Bakery Valuations Job
The customer or business user for the Lyon’s first business application was Geoffrey
Salmon, the director in charge of Cadby Hall Bakeries. Mr. Geoffrey was a descendent
of the founding family and a close relative of the chairman of the company, Harry
Salmon. In June of 1951 Simmons wrote Mr. Geoffrey requesting an opportunity to use
LEO to value the Cadby Hall Bakeries’ output and sales, an application that provided key
decision information for Mr. Geoffrey. Simmons stressed the need for the department to
submit raw data on quantities and products accurately and according to an agreed upon
timetable. “A main board director would never normally have been approached about
details such as this,” Caminer recalls, “but it was felt imperative that there should be the
fullest awareness at the highest level of this first excursion into live office work” (Caminer
et. al., 1998, p. 31). Significantly, Simmons was shrewd enough to know that with
satisfaction and “buy-in” on the part of high level executives, the LEO project had a
better chance of success.
Lyons operated a dozen or more bakeries that shipped baked goods to more than 150
London teashops and other outlets that, in turn, sold the goods to customers.20 Mr.
Geoffrey monitored this business by means of a trading analysis report. This report was
20

Before WWII there were about 250 Lyons teashops. About 70 were destroyed during the war.
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prepared by Simmons’ office each week. It required that three related calculations,
previously done separately, be performed in one pass:
1. Value the output of goods – breads, cakes, pies, etc. – from each of the different
bakeries at standard material, labor, indirect cost, and total factory cost.
2. Value the goods issued to each different channel of sale at standard factory cost,
distribution cost, sales price, and profit margin.
3. Calculate and value at standard factory cost the dispatch stock balances
(“dispatch” was the logistical unit that distributed goods) for each item arising
from differences between the quantity of goods received from the bakeries and
the quantity of goods actually sold through several different channels of sale.
This yielded a valuation of the inventory or stock balance in the field.
In effect Lyons treated each unit as a profit center and calculated transfer prices to
manage the system. Mr. Geoffrey controlled the system by knowing exactly how costs
were flowing among the units. The use of this kind of management technique became
commonplace in the U.S. during the mid-1950s following the publication of Joel Dean’s
influential Harvard Business Review article “Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing,”
but it was rather revolutionary at the time (Dean, 1955).
The LEO Cadby Hall Bakery valuations job combined the three calculations described
above into one integrated executive-oriented report. Producing similar information
before had required 50 hours per week of clerical labor. The LEO application cut the
time required to 8 hours of computer data preparation time per week and 4½ hours per
week computer run time. Run time was eventually lowered to 30 minutes. This initial
installed application was not an especially challenging application for an electronic
computer. Indeed, in an interview for the Science Museum in the 1970s Simmons
observes that since this job could have been accomplished on EDSAC, it might be
considered more scientific than business. Nevertheless, running this pioneering job
proved to be important for developing relations with users, especially high level
executive users, gaining their confidence and getting some practical live action
experience under the team’s belt (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 372-3). Lyons continued to
run this application for over a decade. “Though small,” Caminer states, “the job opened
the way for the larger and more exacting mainstream jobs that constitute an office
workload. Payroll, sales invoicing, stock control, and replenishment all swiftly followed
on LEO” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 8).
Although the calculations for the bakery valuation job were straightforward and did not
require the extensive business systems development that Payroll and other applications
later required, it set an extremely valuable precedent: information is valuable for higher
level management decision making as well as for streamlining operations. This and the
subsequent applications summarized below constitute an early incursion into
management information systems (MIS ). Davis and Olson define MIS as “an
integrated, user-machine system for providing information to support operations,
management, analysis and decision making functions in an organization” (Davis and
Olson, 1985, p. 6).21 With this application of LEO at Lyons, a new approach to
management thinking was being born.

21

Gordon B. Davis is a LEO Award recipient.
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Between 1954 and 1957, Lyons implemented four major innovative business-oriented
programs. In the company’s lexicon, L1 referred to the company’s payroll, L2 to its
teashop distribution job, L3 to the Lyons bakery sales invoicing job, and L4 to the tea
blending job.

Payroll (L1)
The first major applications challenge that the LEO team took on was payroll, L1.
Thompson and Standingford’s report had identified payroll as one of three applications
for business-oriented technology and sketched out the basic logic for automating it.
Payroll is a prototypical business application since it requires multiple inputs and
outputs, has a relatively high volume of transactions, and must be accomplished to meet
scheduled due dates. In addition to timeliness, payroll also requires accuracy. If the
payee does not receive the correct amount, he or she will complain immediately and
begin to lose confidence in the company.
During the 1950s, more than 30,000 employees worked for Lyons. Many of them were
causal or part time workers like wash-up staff or kitchen porters. Annual staff turnover in
some areas approximated 100 percent. Heretofore, the company’s payroll had been
prepared using time tickets, ledger cards, calculators, and accounting machines.
However, upon Simmons’ insistence this manual payroll system was quite efficient
despite its technological limitations. As numerous companies would subsequently find
out, the basic logic of a payroll application is straightforward, but coping with all of its
details can be devilish. Among the variations the LEO programmers had to deal with
were holiday and sick pay, National Insurance Stamps, club and society subscriptions,
loan repayments, taxes, and other deductions that had to be applied against gross pay.
Net pay had to comply with the provisions of the Catering Wage Act’s minimal wage
requirements, although the first payroll was run for factory workers who were not subject
to this act. Pay sheets had to be routed to the “pay at” location at which each employee
was to receive his or her pay envelope. Since many employees were paid in cash, bill
and coin denominations had to be determined and a denomination inventory calculated
for each paying location so that the right amounts of coins and currency were delivered
to the right place by payday.
In the early days of computer applications, just a few firms such as GE and Bank of
America completed a thorough going analysis and “re-engineering” of a business
process before computerizing it. However, Lyons used an even more encompassing
approach, as was its leader’s predilection. Its systems analysts first specified the entire
job in systems terms, including detailed diagrams of all data flows and relationships.22
22

This appears to be an early use of flow charts for this purpose. Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff
show applications of flow charting in their 1957 Introduction to Operations Research (Churchman,
et. a., 1957) The underlying systems theory is developed more completely in Ackoff and Emery,
1972; Churchman 1968, 1971; Churchman and Verhulst, 1960. Optner details a method in his
1960 Systems Analysis for Business Management (Optner, 1960). These are among the first
books applying systems theory to computer-based systems design.
Few if any innovations, however, emerge without precedent. During the early 1920’s several
office equipment companies, notably Burroughs, National Cash Register (NCR), Underwood
Elliott Fisher, Remington Rand (which acquired the Powers Accounting Machine Corporation’s
punch card line), and IBM began proposing information flow systems to make better use of their
technologies including adding machines, cash registers, mechanical calculators and punch card
equipment. (Sobel, 1981, p. 66-88) Business Forms printers such as Moore Business Forms,
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Then, the LEO team implemented the entire payroll program all at once, except for
premium bonuses. Bonus calculations were excluded at that time because the
mathematical computation that was required exceeded available space in the machine’s
working memory. “It was then, and remained, a LEO systems and programming
maxim,” Caminer recalls in drawing a lesson for the future, “that a project, although as
fully embracing as possible, should never be put at risk by trying to cross a bridge too
far” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 36).
Although common place today, in the early 1950s the LEO team was undertaking a task
that a rare number of people had addressed and few had even contemplated.
Employees devote their time, energy, and talent to an organization under terms of
agreement, often stated in formal contracts or laws, specifying what work they will do
and how they will be compensated. From the beginning of the age of organizations,
some method had to be devised to record what the employee actually did, arrive at pay
amount, and issue the pay in an acceptable form. Automating the real world process
required systems thinking. All elements of the process had to be identified and their
relationships determined. Payroll, like all applications, is the product of what the
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein called a “language game.” Designers must interact
with the reality of the situation – a socially constructed reality – and represent it by
means of signs and symbols. In doing this, the LEO team had no precedents to follow.
So, they first studied the process as carefully as they could, wrote down the details in
non-technical terms, and sketched out pro forma reports. Periodically they reviewed
their results with Wages Office management. When the team felt they had captured the
essence of the application, they prepared a hierarchical system of flow charts, the
highest level being the master diagram, the lowest level detailing “the 20 or 30
instruction stages into which the runs were divided” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 37). The
analysts strove for simplicity – focusing primarily on branching routes and not displaying
all of the most intricate details of the calculations within a box. Their initial intent was
that any chart “could be understood and commented upon by any intelligent lay person
associated with the job” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 37).
Executive and user
understanding and buy-in were essential. A comprehensive set of accounting and
completeness checks was implemented to insure accuracy. Caminer, it turns out, was a
stickler for accuracy. He demanded that every routine have some form of check and on
occasion developed some clever and not obvious checking procedures. These
precautions added to the reliability and credibility of LEO’s systems.
Inc. and Standard Register also promoted methods for flow charting information flows. Most of
this development was predicated on the process flow diagramming developed at the beginning of
the 20th century for industrial work by Frederich W. Taylor (1911), and Frank and Lillian Gilbreath.
As Couger has observed during the period between 1920 and 1950 process flow charts were
modified to incorporate forms flows, tabulating procedures and board wiring diagrams. (Couger,
1974, p. 170, see also Couger et, al., 1996, Couger et. al, 1980, and Cougar et. al. 1982). During
the period 1951 to 1960 information process charts were introduced (Grad and Canning, 1969;
see also Canning, 1956). The information algebra developed by the CODASYL Development
Committee and published by ACM in 1962 applied concepts of modern algebra and point set
theory to the task of representing data flows in systems. (CODASYL Development Committee,
1962). Börje Langefors proposed the first comprehensive approach to a theory of information in
1963 and expanded on it in 1966 (Langefors 1963, 1966; 1973; and Bubenko et. al., 1971).
Teichroew and Nunamaker operationalized the theory by developing problem statement language
(PSL), problem statement analyzer (PSA), and Systems Optimization and Design Algorithm
(SODA) (Teichroew 1970, 1971, Nunamaker 1971). (C. West Churchman, Börje Langefors,
Daniel Couger, and Jay Nunamaker have each received the LEO Award.)
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The LEO team was venturing into virgin territory when it ran its first payroll in 1953. No
one in the U.K. had previously developed a payroll program. Few had applied systems
thinking to any real world business phenomena or tried to represent it so that their
associates could understand it and so that a machine could execute it precisely. Likely
not many in the U.S. had done so either. Computers that were even capable of running
a comprehensive payroll application were just becoming available. A few UNIVACs were
installed in 1953. In fact, the first UNIVAC for business applications was installed at the
General Electric Appliance Division to do payroll in 1954 (Lubar, 1993, p. 316).
(According to a 1958 publication, payroll would later be one of the first uses of Grace
Hopper’s FLOW-MATIC compiler running on UNIVAC (Remington Rand, 1958).
Computers that were even capable of running a comprehensive payroll application were
just becoming available. The IBM 650 was released 1953, as was the 701.23 The IBM
702, a more business-oriented machine, was not available until February 1955.24 When
Lyons’ T. R. Thompson and Anthony Barnes visited the U.S. in the summer of 1955,
they witnessed UNIVACs running payroll at U.S. Steel in Pittsburgh. Even at this late
date, IBM executives were skeptical of the applications’ benefits. Although some IBM
customers were developing payroll applications for the IBM 702 and 650 computers, a
company vice president told them that the application had not paid off for the IBM
Poughkeepsie plant. “His view was that payroll could not be done economically on
computers,” they reported (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 53).
Lyons’ pilot payroll was run for a limited set of bakeries in July 1953, and within a year, a
payroll for 10,000 employees was being processed. Processing payroll for ten thousand
employees was the threshold set until a backup computer was available. (Lyons had
about 30,000 employees at the time.) Ultimately the payroll for the entire organization
and other companies such as Ford Motor Co. U.K. was run successfully on LEO I and its
successors. The LEO computers never failed to produce a payroll on time. “Because of
the care that had been employed in constructing the programs,” Caminer remarks with
respect to the system’s efficiency, “the computer time was 1½ seconds per employee as
compared to 8 minutes of human time [a factor of 320] that it had taken using one of the
most efficient precomputer systems anywhere” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p 39).
Fifty years later it is difficult for us, with so much off the shelf software available, to
appreciate fully what the LEO team accomplished. They were literally making it up as
they were going. A crucial component of their efforts was fitting their grand systems
23

The IBM 650 was a magnetic drum computer with either a 1,000 or 2,000-word drum. It had 60
words of magnetic core memory for registers and adders. The earliest version received input
from punched cards but soon thereafter magnetic tape units were added. Its time to multiply two
numbers was 2 milliseconds. By December 1955,32 120 were in operation and 750 on order.
The IBM 701 was a scientific computer dedicated on April 7, 1953. It used electrostatic storage
tubes, a magnetic drum and magnetic tapes. Nineteen were produced and installed. (Source:
Goldstine, 1972, pp. 330-1)
24
A key feature of the IBM 702 was that it used binary coded decimal and alphabetic symbols
making it more applicable to commercial problems. Thompson and Barnes saw several IBM
702s doing rather “small-scale office work” at General Electric during their 1955 trip to the U.S.
and observed customers checking out programs on one at IBM’s Madison Avenue showroom.
About 14 were produced until it was replaced by the IBM 705. It was the company’s first major
foray into business computing. An article “The IBM Type 702, An Electronic Data Processing
Machine for Business” in Volume I of the Journal of ACM published in 1954 lays out the plan for
the machine. (Bashe et al., 1954)
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logic for the application into the severe restrictions placed on programming by the
limitations of the first LEO machine. Laying out file designs, coordinating inputs,
streamlining initial code in order to reduce memory requirements and enhance speed
and efficiency, and managing storage space – all 2048 17-bit words (see Appendix B):
all of these tasks had to be accomplished without the aid of tools or experienced sources
to fall back on. Consequently, the LEO team, consistent with Simmons’ edicts, carefully
documented their work and detailed the procedures they used. This intellectual capital
proved very useful as Lyons ventured into the service bureau business and ran jobs for
a variety of different companies and government agencies (See, for example, Aris,
2000).

The Teashops Distribution Job (L2)
The next application the LEO team undertook was L2, the comprehensive teashops
distribution application. It was, in effect, an extensive elaboration of the initial bakery
valuations program and a first attempt by an organization at implementing a total
management information system.25 During the early 1960s in the U.S. a spate of articles
was published - many heralding but some debunking, or at least, demystifying, the
promise of a “total information system” for business made possible by the computer.26
Then, in 1969, Sherman Blumenthal brought several streams of thought together and
put a more realistic spin on the possibilities in Management Information Systems: A
Framework for Planning and Development (Blumenthal, 1969). From the very
beginning, Simmons and the LEO team believed that to improve the company’s
operations and to justify building a computer on their own they had to take a total
systems approach. In 1954, however, they did not have the benefit of subsequent
thinking on the topic and, consequently, had to go it alone.
Running teashops was at the very heart of the business. Consequently, “teashop
distribution” – managing the flow of goods to the shops – was what today would be
called a “mission critical” or “core” business application.
Prior to WWII Lyons operated about 250 teashops. The war brought many changes to
the company. Due to labor shortages as a result of war, self-service replaced the
popular waitresses called “nippies”. Instead of preparing meals on the premises, most
dishes were prepared in a centralized kitchen and quick frozen to be distributed to the
shops each morning. Further, about 70 shops were destroyed by German bombers,
leaving about 180 operating at the time LEO was conceived. This was a high volume,
low margin business even in the 1920s. “It was calculated that only a farthing [about
one fourth of a penny] profit was made on each of 150 million meals sold annually from
all teashops,” Bird explains, “and that only a decimal of a penny profit was made on the
75,000 tons per week of other goods sold through the shops. As management wished to
control costs to fractions of a penny, the volume of paperwork and the consequent flood
of dull routine processing of business transactions was becoming an accounting
nightmare. More worrying was that a small error in cost accounting could have
25

According to historian Thomas Haigh the first person to define “management information
systems” was Charles Stein in 1959. He described MIS as a computerized tool that meets all
information needs at all levels of management in a “timely, accurate and useful manner.” (Haigh,
2001, p. 36) The LEO team was working with this notion about five years earlier. Davis and
Olson carry the concept future in 1974 and 1985. (Davis and Olson, 1985)
26
Haigh (2001) recounts much of the excitement, controversy and disappointment of this era.
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disastrous effect on profits” (Bird, 2000, p. 304). As the business was rebuilt after WW
II, the pressure on profitability became increasingly intense. Moreover, this was a
notably complex business. The demands associated with operating 180 stores on a
daily basis - producing, distributing, and selling some 250 different products, most
perishable within 24 hours and some, like bread rolls, delivered more than once a day;
and collecting and handling cash -- created significant management control problems.
The organizational structure for this part of the business was fairly rigid and hierarchical.
At the lowest level, each teashop was run by a teashop manageres. (Nearly all of the
managers were female). Six or seven manageresses reported to a section supervisor,
each of whom reported to one of eight divisional superintendents, who, in turn, reported
to the head office, directed by Felix Salmon, a member of the owning family.
Prior to computerization, Systems Research had devised a rather efficient paper-based
system for dealing with the distribution problem. Each manageress was provided with a
carbon paper inter-leafed order book with sheets for each day of the week. Each wrote
down her requirements for a given day and forwarded the original copy to the central
office at Cadby Hall two or three days before the expected delivery. Information on the
sheets included requirements for different types of food items, different packing sites,
and different delivery schedules. The managers kept a carbon copy for reference. The
originals were collected and analyzed in the central office. Total requirements were
calculated, picking and packing lists produced, delivery instructions generated, and the
management accounting and statistical data necessary to charge each shop with the
goods delivered was prepared. “Dispatch” was the name given to the organizational unit
that picked and delivered the items. At about 6:00 a.m. each morning the vans departed
Cadby Hall delivering the goods for the day. This system, though adequate, generated
large masses of paper to be handled. And it was clumsy. Moreover, by requiring almost
all orders to be placed several days ahead of time, last minute adjustments were difficult
to accommodate. As the business grew, it became increasingly difficult and costly to
add the clerical staff needed to process the mounds of paper generated by this system.
Consequently, maintaining these overhead activities was cutting severely into margins.
The LEO team sought to further rationalize and economize this crucial management
process using a total systems approach.
In developing the LEO application, Systems Research first developed and documented a
systems description of the entire process. Then the remarkable and indefatigable David
Caminer personally analyzed batches of order forms to determine patterns. He
discovered that the greatest variation in volume per item was between days of the week.
A Monday’s order generally looked more like a previous Monday’s order than a
Tuesday’s order, and so forth. Hence, adopting the concept of exception reporting, he
decided to have LEO print out a standard Monday order sheet for each teashop, and
similarly for each day of the week. The manageresses would review the standard order
and forward permanent changes to it a week or so prior to when they wanted them put
into effect. By taking this strategy, Caminer was employing a systems concept called
“preprocessing.” Control can be improved in a system in one of two ways: by increasing
the controller’s capability to process information – sometimes called the “brute force”
approach, or by decreasing the amount of data to be processed (Beniger, 1986, p.15).
Lyons took the second approach. By assuming a standard baseline order, the volume of
data to be processed by the application was reduced significantly. But, as would be
expected, shops frequently needed to change some component of their order away from
the standard as late as the evening before in order to respond to unusual events such as
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changes in the weather, a parade or a street closing, or a special order. To
accommodate this need for dynamic change, Caminer came up with a clever solution.
At a predetermined time each day, telephone operators would phone each shop and ask
for any late adjustments to the manager’s order. Wearing headsets, the operators would
take the order changes and simultaneously keypunch them directly into punched cards
to be read into LEO at L2 run time. This provided the basic input to the application. (In
1956 CEO Foster McGraw would authorize a similar system be installed at American
Hospital Supply to control the company’s far-flung inventory. In 1973, this application
would evolve into ASAP – Analytic Systems Automatic Purchasing. ASAP is an historic
exemplar of the strategic use of information systems (McKenney et.al., 1995, pp. 164175).
Accessing its tape files, the L2 program read in the pre-determined standard order,
updated it with any permanent changes submitted, and then applied the daily punch card
changes to determine the order quantity for each product for each shop. Next, the
program compared the total quantity with the production schedule provided by the
kitchens. In the event that orders for an item exceeded production or availability,
substitutes were specified or shortfalls allocated among the shops. Packing notes were
then prepared in predetermined groups for each of the kitchen locations so that the order
could be picked and put up for each teashop. This included calculating the packing
material required for each delivery, including carton dimensions. Grand totals for each
item provided each productive department with an overall figure of demand for its items.
Dispatch received totals of the amounts of each item to be loaded on each van.
Throughout the processing, items were maintained in at least two different sequences:
(1) the sequence that best facilitated the manager’s ordering and (2) the sequence that
best facilitated picking and dispatch. Thus, by translating back and forth as needed
between the manager’s order item numbers and the dispatcher’s routing item numbers,
changes could be made on either side without having to get the agreement of the other
party or having to disturb either party’s natural way of doing their jobs. Thereby,
interdepartmental conflict was reduced. That is, both the teashop managers and the
dispatchers had an information system tailor-made to their specific needs.
Composite dishes – e.g. boiled beef, carrots and dumplings – were ordered by a single
code number and a “goes into” decomposition routine was applied to generate the
pounds of boiled beef, pounds of carrots and quantity of dumplings that dispatch needed
to have packed and delivered to each ordering shop. The program collected numerous
statistics throughout this processing. Since Lyons treated each shop as a profit center,
all deliveries to each teashop were valued at selling price. Monthly, or weekly if needed,
beginning inventory at sales value, plus deliveries, minus sales (as determined from
cash receipts) was compared with ending inventory for each item for control purposes.
Standard costs were applied to arrive at item and unit profit figures.27 In accordance
with the Lyons’ organizational structure, profitability and other forms of information were
reported for each shop, each section, each division, and for the operation as a whole.
Integrating data from L2 and labor statistics from payroll (L1) with data from other
sources, performance metrics were calculated for each item and each organizational
unit. The program prepared exception reports in sequence showing lowest to best unit
performance so that appropriate managerial action could be taken. It also searched for
excessive upward and downward daily adjustments that had been telephoned in so as to
27

“Everything was specified,” according to Ferry, “from the value of the energy needed to bake a
loaf of bread to the thickness of the jam spread on the Swiss rolls” (Ferry, 2003, p. 31).
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uncover suspected “gaming” on the part of managers who wanted to disguise their poor
planning.
The Teashop Distribution program, L2, went live on October 20, 1954, and with
modifications was in continual use throughout the life of the LEOs. Among the
advantages realized by Lyons early on were net savings of about $560 per shop per
week, reduced ordering workload for teashop managers, reduced work load for dispatch
and simpler packing instructions, and the elimination of several paper forms such as
delivery notes. Meanwhile, the overall work load was distributed more evenly throughout
the week, reducing “crunches.” Importantly, sales and marketing improved as well.
Utilizing the additional management information, the teashops managers could more
easily promote sales, and were more aware of lines that did not pay and of teashops,
sections, or divisions that lagged behind the remainder. L2 also served to prevent
teashop managers from making trivial changes to their orders (Caminer et. al.,1998, p.
383).
By implementing the teashop distribution program in 1954, Lyons put in place one of the
first integrated “total information systems” in the world. The company had applied
advanced techniques of management control, such as preprocessing, feedback, and
exception reporting. It had dealt with many of the pitfalls Ackoff later identified in his
classic “Management Misinformation Systems” (Ackoff, 1967). The company reduced
the overall quantity of information managers received (The fallacy of “Give Them More”),
while providing them with better targeted, decision-oriented information. Analysis was
undertaken to determine what information was required to manage each unit effectively
(“The Manager Needs the Information He Wants”), and the requisite information was
provided. Potential conflicts between shop managers and dispatch managers, each of
whom had different interests and goals, were reduced by the social buffering provided by
an item code translator. The company delivered education and training programs to
help managers and others understand how the L2 system worked (“A Manager Does
Not Have To Understand How an Information System Works, Only How to Use It”).
The LEO applications also conformed to the systems theories of Stafford Beer, UK
cybernetics and operational research pioneer, whose books Decision and Control
(1966), Brain of the Firm (1972), and Platform for Change (1975) build on British
cybernetician Ross Ashby’s (1956) profound insights into systems. Business complexity
is handled by applying Ashby’s law of requisite variety. As Enid Mumford explains, a
“viable system” for Beer operates at five levels: Level 1, Operational, performing day-today tasks; Level 2, anti-Oscillation, preventing and solving problems; Level 3,
Optimization, adding new value; Level 4, Development, thinking creatively about
solutions; and, Level 5, Control, meeting targets and standards (Mumford, 2003 pp. 6669). Without the benefit of these formal theories, the LEO group intuitively designed a
system that incorporated many of their concepts.28
But all was not perfect. The training program was only partially successful. Many of
Lyons’ employees had been with the company since before the war and had been
schooled in traditional ways. Because the basic hierarchical organizational structure was
left unchanged, it was like “modern technology grafted to a prewar, almost 19th century
management structure” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 225). Some improvements in the
overall implementation were made when a new champion was assigned. Alec Kirby, “a
28

Enid Mumford is a LEO Award recipient See Mumford 1979, 1983, 1995, and 2003.
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high-flying young manager from the Statistical office who was familiar with both LEO and
the Simmons’ management requirements, was brought in and promoted to become
effectively chief executive of the Teashops Division” and to serve as a proponent of the
L2 system (Caminer et. al., 1998, p. 224). Unfortunately, due to the failure to fully
change the mind-sets of all of the managers and employees, L2 never lived up to its
fullest potential. So, the project fell victim to Ackoff’s (1967) fifth pitfall: the myth “Give a
Manager the Information He Needs and His Decision Making Will Improve.” Many
traditional managers at Lyons were not persuaded to change their behavior. Despite
this shortcoming, however, most observers conclude that the L2 teashop distribution
program solved many pressing management problems and clearly justified the
investment made in it. It improved people’s working lives. “The head staff at this shop
would like to give thanks for LEO. This is a wonderful time saver, work saver and we are
grateful for it,” John Aris quotes from a daily report of the Wembley teashop a few days
after L2 went on stream. “As the Manageresses were a notoriously crusty group this
was a most satisfying achievement” (Aris, 2000, p. 13).

Bakery Sales Invoicing Job (L3)
Sales invoicing was one of the applications identified by Thompson and Standingford in
their 1947 report, and L3 was the follow through on that idea. It was designed to handle
all of the paperwork for Lyon’s largest sales and distribution organization, the Wholesale
Bakeries Rails Department. This department sold and delivered cake and pie supplies
to shopkeepers located all over Britain. During the 1930s, Simmons had pushed to have
a system implemented to reduce the heavy volumes of paper involved in sales invoicing,
and had come up with a novel answer. As Caminer explains, a “special feature of the
system was that [consistent with Simmons’ “write-it-once” objective] only one piece of
paper served as order, packing note, delivery note, and invoice. No paper copy was
retained either in the dispatch or in the offices. Instead, a [micro]film copy, was retained
that could be referred to if any query arose.29 The orders were taken by a salesman,
who and also collected the cash on a one week’s credit basis, so that there was little in
the way of an accounting system” (Caminer et. al., 1998, p56). Thus, by eliminating
paper and reducing the amount of information processed, substantial economies were
realized. Consequently, it was initially difficult to make a business case for applying LEO
to this application because so much of the cost had already been wrung out of the
system. Nevertheless, a team lead by John Grover was able to design a system that
incorporated more of the related tasks and reduced the key-punching input required.
Caminer describes the result. “As by-products of the invoice calculations, LEO
automatically produced instructions as to which of a range of cartons was to be used for
each order, calculated the assembly for packers and loaders, and checked the carriagefree-of-charge thresholds. It also provided each salesman with a cash collection list,
incorporating amounts not yet paid for previous weeks’ deliveries, checked and made
the now standard provision for rapid restarts.” L3 went live in January 1956, and served
as a model program design for other sales invoicing jobs.
29

The earliest use of photography to reduce greatly the size of documents copied by capturing
them on narrow rolls of film began with the introduction of the Recordak system by Eastman
Kodak in 1928. 16-mm, and then 35-mm, film was used in continuous, automatic cameras to
photograph documents. Special projection equipment was required to wind rapidly through the
film, find pertinent frames, and enlarge them. An effective microfilming system required detailed
analysis of paperwork flows. By applying this technology in the early 1930’s Lyons was an early
adopter.
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Tea Blending (L4)
L4 was developed by Frank Land to value the many varieties of tea that Lyons included
in its various tea blends such as Red Label and Green Label. Tea was a major staple in
the Lyons product line, and managing the company’s stock of thousands of chests of
tea, classified by flavor, color, strength, aroma and other characteristics, was an
enormous yet crucial job. The raw tea came from a variety of sources: either purchased
at auctions held in the London center of the tea trade, Mincing Lane, imported from the
company’s tea gardens in the African colonies, or acquired by direct purchase from
growers in India, China, and Ceylon. Each week different strains of tea were mixed in
prescribed proportions to produce the company’s famous blends, which, in turn, were
packaged for distribution and sale. A further complication was that tea coming from
overseas was stored in bonded warehouses and was only released when appropriate
duties were paid. L4 had to deal with these inventories separately. In Land’s program,
the various basic teas were allocated to each blend and valued at standard raw material
prices. Mixture proportions were then used to calculate a standard product price for
each blend. When the blending was completed, checks were made to insure that the
permissible total cost for each blend was adhered to. Valuation totals were calculated
for each product and the total production output. As with all of the Lyon’s applications,
the program prepared accounting, statistical, and management control data for all levels
of management. The tea blending application went live on October 18, 1954, and
according to Land, it continued in service with modifications for another 25 years30
(Land, 1998). Lyons Tea and Lyons Coffee brands still exist.

A Growing Array of Applications
From these beginnings, the LEO team fanned out into almost all parts of the Lyons &
Co.’s and other firms’ businesses: accounting and valuation, reconciliation accounting,
actuarial and insurance-related applications, clerical and office, statistical analysis,
financial and banking, tax tables, inventory, telephone billing, invoicing, utility billing,
weather forecasting, simulations, mail order, railway distancing, and word processing.
Among the organizations the LEO team provided support for were the British
Meteorological Office, the Ordnance Board, Ford Motor Co. U.K., Stewards and Lloyds,
Greenwich London Boroughs, W. D. & H. O. Wills, Army and Airforce Officers payroll,
Ministry of Pensions, Standard Motors, Durlachers Stock Jobbers, HM Customs and
Excise, Rand Mines of Johannesburg, Dunlop, Shell-Mex and British Petroleum,
Freemans Mail Order, VLD of Prague, HM Dockyards, and the British Post Office.
As computer design and components improved, new versions of LEO were released:
LEO I in February 1951; LEO II in May 1957; LEO III in May 1961; LEO 326 in April
1963; LEO 360 in January 1965. Reg Cann, the leader of the Royal Dockyards
information systems group, reports that in 1963 his team evaluated 11 different
manufactures’ computers: English Electric, EMI, ICT, Honeywell, NCR, Burroughs,
Remington Rand, De La Rue Bull, AEI, IBM, and LEO Computers, Ltd. The LEO 360
came out on top.
“ . . . it became clear to us that, while they [the other manufacturers]
30

Land’s blending program did not use linear programming to determine the optimal mix although
his blend solutions had to meet cost constraints. His work, nevertheless, involved leading edge
thinking. In April 1952 Charnes, Cooper and Mellon had published the first Operations Research
application to blending problems in Econometrica (Charnes, et. al, 1952).
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were trying to sell us hardware of which they well knew the technical capabilities, not all
of them were knowledgeable in the ways in which the machines could be used to
process business data, or indeed had the software to do so. LEO Computers were well
equipped here. They had the practical experience of business processing, proven
software, a high-level language (CLEO), a proven compiler, and a proven operating
system. None of the other manufactures could match this” (Caminer, et al, (1998) p.
275).
That was in 1963. At that time Lyons and the LEO team had been in the forefront of
business information processing for over a decade. Having been a prime innovator in
the field, they remained among the leaders until the mid 1960s. But, the world changed
for LEO and its people on April 7, 1964. On that date IBM announced its 360 range of
computers. LEO had been competing with IBM for several years since IBM entered the
UK market after its long standing market division agreement with ICT ended. The 360
drove the nail into the coffin. IBM’s System/360 purportedly allowed users to begin with
a low range system and migrate upward as their needs grew without rewriting their
applications programs.31 It was directed to meet users’ needs for orderly growth from
mechanized accounting machines to several consecutive tiers of sophisticated, high
speed computers. At the time, IBM had some 8,000 low level 1401 punch card
“walloper” computers installed in the field. This provided the company with the
marketing advantage of a large installed base to augment its still extensive base of noncomputer punch card EAM (electronic accounting machine) equipment.
Nevertheless, the LEO Group, which had been reformed in February, 1963 after the
merger with the computer department to form English Electric LEO, kept innovating for
several years until it reached the peak of its installations in 1965. LEO continued to
produce excellent machines and trustworthy business systems. A large scale LEO III
was released in May of 1961 that incorporated early designs for real-time and multiaccess. Among its technological advances were early applications of diode and
transistor technology, magnetic core storage, and transistor registers. The LEO III
design also featured two major innovations: microprogramming and multiprogramming,
or time-sharing. Many of the most prestigious computer orders placed during this period
in the U.K. went to this system. But the writing, nevertheless, was on the wall. IBM was
simply too forceful as a sales and marketing organization. Moreover, it produced
31

Business historian Robert Sobel refers to the IBM System/360 as “The Incomparable 360”
because it remade the industry (Sobel, 1981). The company committed virtually all of its $5
billion of assets behind it and succeeded. The 360 and its upward compatible successor,
System/370, were so widely used during the 1960’s and 1970’s that it became almost essential
for everyone in the computer field to be aware of the major aspects of the lines’ hardware and
software. This series of machines established the standard for the era. The basic unit of
information in the 360/370 was an eight-bit byte. Four bytes comprised a word. By today’s
standards the magnetic core memories of the early 360’s were severely limited in size, ranging
from 64K bytes to 1M bytes on the largest machine. Upon its release the 360 was intended to
obsolete virtually every other existing computer. According to Campbell-Kelly and Aspray this
“‘most crucial and portentous – as well as perhaps the riskiest – business judgments of recent
times’ paid off handsomely. Literally thousands of orders for System/360 flooded in, far
exceeding IBM’s ability to deliver; in the first two years of production, it was able to satisfy less
than half of the 9,000 orders on its books” (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996, p. 144). The LEO
organization simply could not compete with this enormous marketing power. IBM’s success
came despite the fact that its operating system OS/360 was initially faulty, late and over budget
(See Brooks, 1975).
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hardware that for the most part worked well enough. In July 1968 the LEO group, as
part of the Government’s industrial rationalization program, merged with ICT to form ICL.
The group was absorbed by the larger ICT component and essentially lost its identity.
The government offered a multimillion pound loan as an inducement to be repaid only if
ICT became profitable. Neither party was enthusiastic. The new company did not
survive, and the loan was never repaid. Finally, in 1981 the British Post Office took the
last LEO 326s out of service. The saga was finished.

Epilogue
Hubris is described as “exaggerated pride, self-confidence, or arrogance, frequently
resulting in retribution” (Kroll, et al., 2000, p. 117). It derives in part from a series of
successes and an uncritical acceptance of accolades received following those
successes. Hubris often leads to an excessive emphasis on perfection and a belief that
one’s ideas and capabilities are superior to all others. Toward the end of its life the LEO
team succumbed to hubris and became dismissive of others in the field, especially IBM.
Caminer cites as an epitaph a quote from a paper by Dr. John Hendry entitled “The
Teashop Computer Manufacture: J. Lyons”:
“In the end, they [the LEO team] were perhaps too strong on the applications side.
Carried away by their own sophistication and obsessed by the pioneering spirit, they
failed to understand the social and psychological needs of ordinary customers with
ordinary muddled systems and ordinary resistance to change” (Caminer et.al., 1998,
p. 140).
An addictive application of whole systems thinking, inordinate attention to detail, and a
dedication to professionalism as a code of honor, traits that had resulted in so many
successes - in the end contributed to LEO’s bitter demise. It was not because they were
inept, but because they were too good at insuring profitability in the face of IBM’s more
cost effective approach.
Importantly, however, this special group of people who conceived, built, programmed,
and applied a succession of LEOs did leave an abiding legacy. They showed us how to
secure improvements in an organization’s performance by means of adroit systems
analysis and design. And they provided the early incursions into ICT hardware and
software necessary to implement these designs. Many of their number went on to
influence the practice and teaching of information systems elsewhere.32 It is a legacy of
which to be proud.

32

The demise of LEO led to the dispersion of key LEO people who propagated the LEO
methodology widely in the UK and also the USA. For example Frank Land became chairman of
the National Computing Councils’ Systems Analysis Examination Board and chaired the British
Computer Societies working party on setting up curricula in information systems. Gosden and
Dixon in the US and Hermon, Aris, Gifford, Hornstein, Feeney, Holley, Ralph Land, Josephs,
Jackson, John Smith and others in the UK: all had influential careers with many ending up in very
senior positions in major corporations. Moreover, the LEO service bureau pioneered serious
outsourcing.
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Recipients
C. West Churchman
J. Daniel Couger
Börje Langefors
Enid Mumford

2000

Gordon B. Davis

2001

Richard O. Mason
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2002

Paul Gray
Jay F. Nunamaker, Jr.

2003

Frank Land
John F. Rockart

Appendix B
LEO I Technological Characteristics
Logic circuitry:
Storage type:
Storage size:
Store access time:
Backing store:
Word size:
Add time:
Channels:
Peripherals:
Innovative features:

Thermionic and Ge diodes. Hard valve amplifiers
Wholly serial
Mercury delay tubes
2,048, 17-bit words.
500µsecs
None
17 or 35, 4-bit character.
1,300µsecs.
Four input and output.
Paper tape read, card read/punch, line printers.
Automatic clock pulse frequency control. Convert
and reconvert instructions. Analytical marginal
testing. Data preparation and checking equipment.

Source: Bird, 1994, p. 257.
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